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Abstract 
 
 
The aim of the paper is to combine the systemic approach to 
labour market institutions with the analysis of the role played by 
the organisational forms of the bargaining partners, which favour 
coordination both inter partes and intra partes, in order to charac-
terise the 19 countries considered. The methodology adopted is 
based on Multiple Correspondence Analysis and on the use of a 
device called doubling. The results show a clear-cut distinction be-
tween two groups of countries: the former is characterised by the 
absence of institutional mechanisms of coordination whereas the 
latter by the presence of the organisational forms. In details, the 
countries with regulated labour market functioning but without any 
control of wages at macroeconomic level have the worst long term 
unemployment performance. The inter partes coordination role of 
the government entails the choice of a specific trade-off between 
direct intervention in the bargaining process and fiscal policy. This 
trade off performs well when it is supported by intra partes coordi-
nation devices. The evidence confirms the existence of the institu-
tional equivalence, leading to the conclusion that better unem-
ployment performances go along with specific institutional set-ups. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
The debate on labour market institutions has undergone a 
significant change since the mid-nineties. In the literature has 
grown the need for a systemic approach to the role played by insti-
tutions and organisations in labour market functioning as only a 
comprehensive analysis of the complementarities between these 
factors allows defining labour market institutional systems and an 
in-depth understanding of their impact on macroeconomic per-
formance. In this respect, Nickell (1997) though investigating the 
causal links between single institutions and macroeconomic per-
formance, has underlined the complementarity between couples of 
institutions. Starting from the complexity of exchange relations on 
this market, it has been possible to overcome the well-known dis-
tinction between decentralised and regulated/corporatist markets. 
The evolution of some corporatist economies has shown the im-
portance of combining the need for guarantees in order to stabilise 
social consensus, with forms of organisational flexibility, fostering 
competitiveness in a context of increasing globalisation and market 
integration. Theoretical models of competitive corporatism (Hartog 
e Teulings, 1998) or regulated co-operation (Regini, 1997) have 
been developed. They are based on the principle of interest 
mediation, achieved through the delegation of policy functions and 
the participation of all the agents involved in the bargaining proc-
ess rather than through pure exchange mechanism and the 'pie 
sharing'. A broad view of these aspects has led to the approach of 
'institutional equivalence' (Schmid, 1995), which goes beyond the 
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stitutional equivalence' (Schmid, 1995), which goes beyond the 
mere evaluation of the wage bargaining process characterising the 
traditional distinction between centralisation and decentralisation. It 
has stressed the importance of policy objectives, collective prefer-
ences for the 'pie sharing' and consensual support to institutional 
decisions. 
Interestingly, the role played by intra partes co-ordination - 
within unions and firm organisations - in the decision making proc-
ess of wage bargaining has drawn some attention (Soskice, 1990; 
Hartog e Teulings, 1998; Nickell, 1997). As Flanagan (1999) has 
noticed, it has been emphasised the link between institutional as-
pects of the bargaining structure and economic performance, 
partly neglecting the mediation role of government. As to this as-
pect, often the objectives of unions and firms can be in contrast 
with the macroeconomic goals of governments, and the achieve-
ment of a socially desirable solution in terms of trade-off between 
unemployment and inflation can be enhanced by the inter partes 
co-ordinating role of the government. Such mediation role of the 
government may be crucial for the compatibility of firms' and un-
ions' choices with macroeconomic goals and collective welfare. 
In this framework, the analysis taking into account the com-
plementarity between the systemic approach to labour market 
institutions and organisation and the one considering the mecha-
nisms of interaction between the agents involved in the bargaining 
process, discloses the possibility of an in-depth understanding of 
market functioning and macroeconomic performances. 
The interaction between the bargaining agents, in turn, cannot 
leave out of consideration inter partes and intra partes co-
ordination forms with the government playing a mediation role. 
Thus, the objective of this paper is to verify the possibility of char-
acterising the labour markets of some countries by using the inte-
gration of the two approaches described above and by singling out 
the complementarities both among institutional features of the bar-
gaining systems and between the latter and intra partes/inter 
partes co-ordination forms. In this respect the data set used con-
cerns the period 1989-1994, which precedes the more recent evo-
lution of some countries like the Dutch Employment Miracle and 
the diffusion of 'social pacts' in several European countries. This 
choice has been driven by the need for a theoretical reference 
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concerning this period, supported by a consolidated debate in lit-
erature. 
The methodology adopted is the multiple correspondence 
analysis with the doubling technique (Greenacre, 1993), which has 
been only recently used in this type of investigation. The paper is 
articulated as follows: in §2 the data set will be described; §3 con-
tains some methodological issues whereas §4 the analysis of the 
results; in §5 there are some comments on the results and in §6 
final conclusions are drawn. 
 
 
 
 
2. The data set 
 
 
The data set concerns the period 1989-1994 (Tab. 1) and 
mainly consists of the indicators of labour market rigidities in terms 
of labour protection in the countries considered. They are the fol-
lowing: 
1) Employment protection index, based on the rigidity of hiring 
and firing rules. Country classification follows a rank from 1 to 
20. The latter represents the case of the most rigid procedure. 
2) Labor Standard index, representing the rules and norms gov-
erning labour conditions (working time, labour protection, the 
presence of fixed term contracts, minimum wages, employees 
representation rights). The ranking goes from 0 (absence of 
legislation or weak regulation) to 10 (strict legislation). 
The indicators regarding unemployed protection are: 
1) Benefits replacement rate: the ratio of unemployment subsi-
dies to income. 
2) Benefits duration: the duration of unemployment benefits. 
Moreover there are the indices corresponding to the degree of 
co-ordination among unions, on the one hand, and firm organisa-
tions on the other: 
1) Union Co-ordination: co-ordination among unions during wage 
bargaining. The index ranges from 1 to 3, and increases with 
the degree of co-ordination. 
2) Employer Co-ordination: co-ordination among firm organisa-
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tions during wage bargaining. The index ranges from 1 to 3, 
and increases with the degree of co-ordination. 
Finally, the indices corresponding to the bargaining structure 
and the role of the government are: 
1) Centralisation: the index is ranked from 1 to 3 and rises with 
the level of centralisation. 
2) Government: degree of government involvement in the bar-
gaining process. 
3) Union Density: the ratio of union members to the total of all 
wage and salary earners. 
4) Bargaining Coverage: percentage of workers covered by un-
ion bargaining. 
5) Active Labour Market Policies: expenditures aimed at helping 
unemployed back into work. It is given by the ratio of expendi-
ture per unemployed to GDP per member of the labour force. 
It includes public spending for training, assistance during job 
search and for assisting disabled. 
6) Payroll Tax Rate: is an indicator though unstable, of the inci-
dence of the tax burden on wages. It is given by the ratio of 
labour costs to wage earned. The greater the index, the 
greater the gap between labour cost and wage earned de-
pending on the tax burden. 
7) Total Tax Rate: it includes not average payroll tax rate but 
also the income and consumption tax rates. 
Almost all the indicators are commonly used in the analyses of 
the role of labour market institutions (Nickell, 1997), whereas the 
indicator of government involvement in the bargaining process 
(Golden, Lange e Wallerstein, 1997) has been used by Flanagan 
(1999). 
 
 
TAB. 1 – DATA SET 1989 - 1994 
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AuStria 16 6 50 2 3 3 3 46,2 98 22,6 53,7 6 8,3 
BElgium 17 5 60 4 2 2 3 51,2 90 21,5 49,8 4 14,6 
DEnmark 5 3 90 2,5 3 3 2 71,4 69 0,6 46,3 5 10,3 
FInland 10 6 63 2 2 3 3 72 95 25,5 65,9 8 16,4 
FRance 14 7 57 3 2 2 2 9,8 93,5 38,8 63,8 3 8,8 
GErmany 15 7 63 4 2 3 2 32,9 91 23 53 3 25,7 
ITaly 20 8 20 0,5 2 2 2 38,8 82,5 40,2 62,9 3,7 10,3 
The Netherlands 9 6 70 2 2 2 1 25,5 76 27,5 56,5 6 6,9 
NOrway 11 6 65 1,5 3 3 3 56 74,5 17,5 48,6 5 14,7 
POrtugal 18 5 65 0,8 2 2 2 31,8 75 14,5 67,6 0 18,8 
SPain 19 8 70 3,5 2 1 2 11 77 33,2 54,2 0 4,7 
SWeden 13 8 80 1,2 3 3 2 82,5 87,5 37,8 70,7 8 59,3 
SwitZerland 6 4 70 1 1 3 2 26,6 51,5 14,5 38,6 3 8,2 
UK 7 1 38 4 1 1 2 39,1 47 13,8 40,8 2 6,4 
CAnada 3 3 59 1 1 1 1 35,8 37 13 42,7 2 5,9 
US 1 1 50 0,5 1 1 1 15,6 18 20,9 43,8 2 3 
JApan 8 2 60 0,5 2 2 1 25,4 22 16,5 36,3 4 4,3 
AUstralia 4 4 36 4 2 1 3 40,4 80 2,5 28,7 10 3,2 
New Zealand 2 4 30 4 1 1 1 44,8 49 0 34,8 10 6,8 
Source: OECD, Job Study (1994), Part II, Table 6.7, column 5; OECD Employment Outlook (1994), Table 4.8, column 6; Nickell (1997); U.S. Department of 
Health and Social Service, Social Security Programmes Throughout the World (1993); OECD, Employment Outlook, (1995), Table T. OECD, Employment Out-
look, (1997), Golden, Lange e Wallerstein, (1997). 
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3. Methodology 
 
 
The aim of this analysis is to identify a lower - dimensional 
subspace which explains the latent relations among the variables 
and to plot the countries (observational units of our analysis) on 
this subspace. A useful method for this study is the Correspon-
dence Analysis (CA). In fact, the Correspondence Analysis is a 
multidimensional graphical technique for categorical data, and it 
has many similarities with the Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA), which was a reason for the French to label correspondence 
analysis as analyse factorielle des correspondences. The basic 
idea of these two methods is that the set of variables can be de-
scribed as a different linear combination of a smaller number of 
common factors. The aim is to find these latent factors and to re-
duce the original dimensionality of the set of variables, with the 
minimum loss of information, and to have an easier global picture 
of the association or “interaction” among the qualitative variables. 
The “leading case” of a data matrix suitable for the correspon-
dence analysis is a two way contingency table which expresses 
the observed association between two qualitative variables (the 
rows and the columns of the data matrix). This is the Simply Cor-
respondence Analysis, but the CA could be extended to a more 
general indicator matrix, where more than two discrete variables 
have been observed on each observational units (individuals, 
cases or subjects). The correspondence Analysis of this matrix is 
called Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA). 
In this study we have n = 19 observational units, countries, 
and m = 13 categories or variables indicating different institutional 
aspects. Besides our original data are reported in the form of rating 
from 0 (the lowest presence of the variables) to 4 (the highest 
presence of the variables). In this particular case it is usually justi-
fiable the introduction of the data transformation using the tech-
nique known as doubling (Greenacre, 1993, Greenacre, 1984) 
The idea behind doubling is to allocate two complementary 
sets of data to each rating scale, one labelled as the “positive” pole 
of the scale and the other the “negative” pole. In this way we ob-
tain a bipolar or doubled data matrix comprising both the original 
and the reflected (complementary) forms of the datai. 
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In order to introduce correspondence analysis of bipolar data 
we must firstly say that we can analyse the table of ratings in its 
original form. One method is to transform the ratings in a dummy 
1/0 for each score of the scale. The latter should be considered as 
a single variable, but by this token we loose the ordinal relation 
with the other scores of the scale. 
Alternatively, we can consider the rating as a nominal variable 
and apply the traditional MCA to this data matrix. In this case the 
inherent ordering of the categories is ignored. For example in a 1 - 
5 scale if an observational unit (individuals, cases or subjects) 
scores 1 for all the m variables, and another scores 5 for all the m 
variables, the two subjects have the same profiles [1/(m´1) ed 
5/(m´5)] and thus have identical positions in a correspondence 
map. The average rating of the subjects should only be taken in 
account in the massii, not in the subject’s position and then the 
subject who has the highest rating should have a higher weight in 
the total inertia (chi - squared distance or dispersion measure of 
the variables) computation. For example, Australia and Austria re-
spectively have an original rating of 0 and 3 on the scale of the 
variable “v1” (Tab. 2). In this case the traditional Correspondence 
Analysis would give a higher weight to Austria than to Australia. 
This procedure would be right if 3 were a frequency or in other 
words if the variable “v1” counted 3 times in Austria and 0 times in 
Australia. But in our matrix we have ratings and we must taking 
into account the absolute nature of the ratings and it has no sense 
to attribute a higher weight to Austria than to Australia. Applying 
the traditional MCA to a data matrix of rating scale, the notions of 
profile, mass and total inertia have no meaning because we do not 
have any table of frequencies. 
Secondly, much of the success of the analysis is due to the 
fact that the subjects (countries) represent a fairly complete spec-
trum of ratings, because the traditional correspondence analysis 
displays the positions of the individual group relative to the spec-
trum of groups included in the analysis. 
Finally, the analysis should not be invariant to the direction of 
the rating scale. In fact if each rating is represented by subtracting 
it from the upper bound (4 in our case) so that 0 corresponds to 
the highest presence of the variables and 4 to the lowest one, then 
the traditional MCA completely changes character. 
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The solution to these problems is to transform the original 
data, which result in the doubling of the size of the original data 
matrix. With this transformation, the geometric concepts of profile, 
mass and total inertia are more justifiable. In fact, in a doubled ma-
trix for each country we have the original rating and its comple-
ment, calculated with respect to the highest value of the scale, by 
this token, each subject (country) and each variable have the 
same weight. In particular the row sums of this matrix are equal to 
a constant for any individual group and the column sums of the 
pair columns of each variable are equal to a constant tooiii. 
v The row sum is equal to 52, which is the upper bound (4) mul-
tiplied by the number of variables (m = 13), consequently the 
average column profile or row masses are equal to 5,3% 
(1/19). The row masses are the weights of the row profiles in 
the calculation of the Chi - squared distance or inertia of the 
tableiv and then the countries have an equal weight in this 
calculation. 
v For the columns one has to consider the pair of columns (posi-
tive pole and negative pole) of each variable or category. The 
sum of the column pairs is equal to 76, that is the upper bound 
(4) multiplied by the number of countries (n = 19) and the av-
erage row profile or column masses are equal to 7,7% (1/13). 
Thus, each variable receives equal weight in the calculation of 
inertia and the (origin) centroids of each pair of column points 
p+ (positive pole) p- (negative pole) are all at the origin in the 
correspondence displayv. 
Besides the doubling establishes symmetry between the two 
poles of the bipolar variables and the correspondence analysis is 
invariant with respects to the choice of the scale direction. In order 
to understand this fact, one has to say that the fractional rating Piq 
(the rating divided by its upper bound) is analogous to the probabil-
ity of the subject i to be at the positive pole p+, and 1-Piq is the 
probability of being at the negative pole p-. For example, in the 
case of Austria the fractional ratings for the variable v1 and its 
complement W1 respectively are 3/4 e 1/4, then for Austria the 
probability of being at the positive pole is 75% and 25% at the 
negative pole of the variable v1. The sum of these probabilities 
weighted by the relative length of the scale (upper bound of the 
rating divided by the sum of the upper value of all the variables - 
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4/52) gives the row average profile or column masses 7,7% (Tab. 
4) constant for any variable. Then each subject’s “response” is 
treated as a positive mass divided between the two poles, analo-
gous to a pair of probabilities assigned to each pole. 
In a doubled matrix, other than the general concept of the tra-
ditional MCA, it is necessary to add the concepts of polarisation of 
the observations and of their average on each variable. We can 
distinguish two types of polarisations: individual polarisation which 
summarises how near the poles of individual observations lie, for 
each variable; the polarisation of the average (or polarity) which 
indicates how near the average of each variables lie to the poles. 
The ratio of the polarisation of the average to individual polarisa-
tion is called relative polarisation. 
The inertia (and then the dispersion) of a specific variable q is 
related to the relative polarisation, and the variables contribute with 
their inertia to explain the total inertia which is a measure of the 
variability of the data: 
1. for a fixed polarisation of the average, the inertia increases 
when the individual ratings are more polarized. In fact, consid-
ering two variables, if the average ratings are equally distant 
from the poles, the higher contribution to the chi - squared dis-
tance derives from the variable with the higher individual po-
larisation, that is the variable with the individual rating closer to 
one of the two poles; 
2. for a fixed polarisation of individual ratings, the inertia of a 
variable actually decreases when the average is more polar-
ised. In fact, if individual observations of two variables have 
the same distance from the poles, the higher contribution to 
the chi - squared distance derives from the variable with the 
lower polarisation of the average, that is an average more 
centred. 
Graphically, the positive poles of the variables are depicted 
with small letters whereas the negative poles with capital letters. 
These endpoints could be joined by a straight line which passes 
through the centre (centroid). It is important to consider not only 
the total length between the opposite poles but also the length 
both of the positive segment and of the negative one. The ratio of 
the two segments indicate the polarisation of the average, instead 
the total length of the segment depends on the variability and the 
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polarisation of the data average. The total length is proportional to 
the standard deviation of the fractional ratings (i.e. the ratings di-
vided by their respective upper bound) and the polarisation of the 
average. 
For example, considering two variables, we can have three 
cases: 
a) the ratio of the negative and positive segments of each vari-
ables are the same but the total lengths are different; this 
means that the variables have the same polarisation of the 
average but the standard deviation is higher for the variables 
presenting a longer total length; 
b) the segment total length of each variables is the same, but the 
origin divides the length into different length segments, then 
the relation between standard deviation and polarisation is 
such that the least polarised set of responses must have the 
highest standard deviation; 
c) if both total lengths and ratios of the subdivisions are different, 
as is often the case, then there is an interaction between 
standard deviation and polarisation of the average, giving the 
total length, which increases both due to increasing standard 
deviation and to increasing polarisation. 
It is important to add that the greater the variance the higher 
the contribution of the variable to explain the total inertia of the 
data. Consequently, with the same total length of the segments a 
greater contribution to the inertia derives from the variables with a 
lower polarisation of the average (Case b). With the same polarisa-
tion of the average a greater contribution to the inertia derives from 
the variables with a higher total length (case a). 
 
 
 
 
4. Description of the results 
 
 
In the “doubled” matrix (Tab. 2) for any of the 19 countries 
considered each variable (transformed in a scale indicatorvi) has 
two values: the former, in small letters, represents the variable on 
the positive scale (positive pole)whereas the latter in capital letters 
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is the complement with the former on the negative scale (negative 
pole). 
As one can notice, the row totals of the matrix are equal to a 
constant (44) obtained by summing up the maximum score of each 
variable and the mass is given by (1/19)x100 = 5.3%, where 19 is 
the number of individuals (Tab. 4). The sum of the column pairs is 
equal to 76, that is the upper bound (4) multiplied by the number of 
countries (n = 19). Thus, the average row profile or column mass 
is equal to 7,7% (1/13)x100, where 13 is the number of variables 
(Tab. 3). 
 
 
 
TAB. 2 – DOUBLED MATRIX 
 v1 W1 v2 W2 v3 W3 v4 W4 v5 W5 v6 W6 v7 W7 v8 W8 v9 W9 t1 T1 t2 T2 t3 T3 t4 T4 
T
o
ta
l 
AUstralia 0 4 2 2 0 4 4 0 0 4 2 2 3 1 4 0 2 2 0 4 0 4 0 4 4 0 52 
AuStria 3 1 3 1 1 3 2 2 1 3 2 2 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 3 1 3 1 2 2 52 
BElgium 3 1 2 2 2 2 4 0 3 1 3 1 4 0 4 0 2 2 2 2 3 1 1 3 2 2 52 
Canada 0 4 1 3 1 3 1 3 0 4 1 3 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 1 3 1 3 0 4 52 
DEnmark 1 3 1 3 4 0 2 2 1 3 4 0 2 2 2 2 4 0 4 0 0 4 1 3 2 2 52 
Finland 2 2 3 1 2 2 2 2 3 1 4 0 4 0 4 0 2 2 4 0 3 1 4 0 4 0 52 
France 3 1 3 1 1 3 3 1 1 3 0 4 4 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 0 4 0 0 4 52 
GErmany 3 1 3 1 2 2 4 0 4 0 1 3 4 0 2 2 2 2 4 0 3 1 3 1 0 4 52 
Italy 4 0 4 0 0 4 0 4 1 3 1 3 3 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 0 4 0 2 2 52 
Japan 1 3 1 3 2 2 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 2 2 2 2 1 3 0 4 2 2 52 
NOrway 2 2 3 1 2 2 1 3 3 1 3 1 2 2 4 0 4 0 4 0 1 3 1 3 2 2 52 
NZealand 0 4 2 2 0 4 4 0 0 4 2 2 1 3 0 4 0 4 0 4 1 3 0 4 4 0 52 
Netherlands 2 2 3 1 3 1 2 2 0 4 0 4 2 2 0 4 2 2 2 2 3 1 3 1 2 2 52 
POrtugal 4 0 2 2 2 2 0 4 3 1 1 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 3 4 0 2 2 52 
Spain 4 0 4 0 3 1 3 1 0 4 0 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 4 4 0 3 1 2 2 52 
SWeden 2 2 4 0 4 0 1 3 4 0 4 0 3 1 2 2 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 52 
SwitZerland 1 3 2 2 3 1 1 3 1 3 0 4 1 3 2 2 0 4 4 0 1 3 0 4 0 4 52 
UK 1 3 0 4 0 4 4 0 0 4 1 3 1 3 2 2 0 4 0 4 1 3 1 3 0 4 52 
Usa 0 4 0 4 1 3 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 3 1 1 3 0 4 52 
Total 36 40 43 33 33 43 38 38 25 51 29 47 42 34 38 38 36 40 40 36 41 35 39 37 34 42 988 
  76  76  76  76  76  76  76  76  76  76  76  76  76  
 
 
 
 
 
TAB. 3 – ROW PROFILES 
 v1 W1 v2 W2 v3 W3 v4 W4 v5 W5 v6 W6 v7 W7 v8 W8 v9 W9 t1 T1 t2 T2 t3 T3 t4 T4 total 
AUstralia 0,0% 7,7% 3,3% 4,4% 0,0% 7,7% 7,7% 0,0% 0,0% 7,7% 3,8% 3,8% 5,8% 1,9% 7,7% 0,0% 3,8% 3,8% 0,0% 7,7% 0,0% 7,7% 0,0% 7,7% 7,7% 0,0% 100% 
AuStria 5,8% 1,9% 5,5% 2,2% 1,9% 5,8% 3,8% 3,8% 2,6% 5,1% 3,8% 3,8% 7,7% 0,0% 7,7% 0,0% 7,7% 0,0% 7,7% 0,0% 5,1% 2,6% 5,1% 2,6% 3,8% 3,8% 100% 
BElgium 5,8% 1,9% 4,4% 3,3% 3,8% 3,8% 7,7% 0,0% 5,1% 2,6% 5,8% 1,9% 7,7% 0,0% 7,7% 0,0% 3,8% 3,8% 3,8% 3,8% 5,1% 2,6% 2,6% 5,1% 3,8% 3,8% 100% 
Canada 0,0% 7,7% 2,2% 5,5% 1,9% 5,8% 1,9% 5,8% 0,0% 7,7% 1,9% 5,8% 0,0% 7,7% 0,0% 7,7% 0,0% 7,7% 0,0% 7,7% 2,6% 5,1% 2,6% 5,1% 0,0% 7,7% 100% 
DEnmark 1,9% 5,8% 2,2% 5,5% 7,7% 0,0% 3,8% 3,8% 2,6% 5,1% 7,7% 0,0% 3,8% 3,8% 3,8% 3,8% 7,7% 0,0% 7,7% 0,0% 0,0% 7,7% 2,6% 5,1% 3,8% 3,8% 100% 
Finland 3,8% 3,8% 5,5% 2,2% 3,8% 3,8% 3,8% 3,8% 5,1% 2,6% 7,7% 0,0% 7,7% 0,0% 7,7% 0,0% 3,8% 3,8% 7,7% 0,0% 5,1% 2,6% 7,7% 0,0% 7,7% 0,0% 100% 
France 5,8% 1,9% 6,6% 1,1% 1,9% 5,8% 5,8% 1,9% 2,6% 5,1% 0,0% 7,7% 7,7% 0,0% 3,8% 3,8% 3,8% 3,8% 3,8% 3,8% 7,7% 0,0% 7,7% 0,0% 0,0% 7,7% 100% 
GErmany 5,8% 1,9% 6,6% 1,1% 3,8% 3,8% 7,7% 0,0% 7,7% 0,0% 1,9% 5,8% 7,7% 0,0% 3,8% 3,8% 3,8% 3,8% 7,7% 0,0% 5,1% 2,6% 5,1% 2,6% 0,0% 7,7% 100% 
Italy 7,7% 0,0% 7,7% 0,0% 0,0% 7,7% 0,0% 7,7% 2,6% 5,1% 1,9% 5,8% 5,8% 1,9% 3,8% 3,8% 3,8% 3,8% 3,8% 3,8% 7,7% 0,0% 7,7% 0,0% 3,8% 3,8% 100% 
Japan 1,9% 5,8% 1,1% 6,6% 3,8% 3,8% 0,0% 7,7% 0,0% 7,7% 0,0% 7,7% 0,0% 7,7% 0,0% 7,7% 3,8% 3,8% 3,8% 3,8% 2,6% 5,1% 0,0% 7,7% 3,8% 3,8% 100% 
NOrway 3,8% 3,8% 5,5% 2,2% 3,8% 3,8% 1,9% 5,8% 5,1% 2,6% 5,8% 1,9% 3,8% 3,8% 7,7% 0,0% 7,7% 0,0% 7,7% 0,0% 2,6% 5,1% 2,6% 5,1% 3,8% 3,8% 100% 
NZealand 0,0% 7,7% 3,3% 4,4% 0,0% 7,7% 7,7% 0,0% 0,0% 7,7% 3,8% 3,8% 1,9% 5,8% 0,0% 7,7% 0,0% 7,7% 0,0% 7,7% 2,6% 5,1% 0,0% 7,7% 7,7% 0,0% 100% 
Netherlands 3,8% 3,8% 5,5% 2,2% 5,8% 1,9% 3,8% 3,8% 0,0% 7,7% 0,0% 7,7% 3,8% 3,8% 0,0% 7,7% 3,8% 3,8% 3,8% 3,8% 5,1% 2,6% 5,1% 2,6% 3,8% 3,8% 100% 
POrtugal 7,7% 0,0% 4,4% 3,3% 3,8% 3,8% 0,0% 7,7% 5,1% 2,6% 1,9% 5,8% 3,8% 3,8% 3,8% 3,8% 3,8% 3,8% 3,8% 3,8% 2,6% 5,1% 7,7% 0,0% 3,8% 3,8% 100% 
Spain 7,7% 0,0% 7,7% 0,0% 5,8% 1,9% 5,8% 1,9% 0,0% 7,7% 0,0% 7,7% 3,8% 3,8% 3,8% 3,8% 3,8% 3,8% 0,0% 7,7% 7,7% 0,0% 5,1% 2,6% 3,8% 3,8% 100% 
SWeden 3,8% 3,8% 7,7% 0,0% 7,7% 0,0% 1,9% 5,8% 7,7% 0,0% 7,7% 0,0% 5,8% 1,9% 3,8% 3,8% 7,7% 0,0% 7,7% 0,0% 7,7% 0,0% 7,7% 0,0% 7,7% 0,0% 100% 
SwitZerland 1,9% 5,8% 3,3% 4,4% 5,8% 1,9% 1,9% 5,8% 2,6% 5,1% 0,0% 7,7% 1,9% 5,8% 3,8% 3,8% 0,0% 7,7% 7,7% 0,0% 2,6% 5,1% 0,0% 7,7% 0,0% 7,7% 100% 
UK 1,9% 5,8% 0,0% 7,7% 0,0% 7,7% 7,7% 0,0% 0,0% 7,7% 1,9% 5,8% 1,9% 5,8% 3,8% 3,8% 0,0% 7,7% 0,0% 7,7% 2,6% 5,1% 2,6% 5,1% 0,0% 7,7% 100% 
Usa 0,0% 7,7% 0,0% 7,7% 1,9% 5,8% 0,0% 7,7% 0,0% 7,7% 0,0% 7,7% 0,0% 7,7% 0,0% 7,7% 0,0% 7,7% 0,0% 7,7% 5,1% 2,6% 2,6% 5,1% 0,0% 7,7% 100% 
Total 3,6% 4,0% 4,3% 3,4% 3,3% 4,4% 3,8% 3,8% 2,6% 5,1% 2,9% 4,8% 4,3% 3,4% 3,8% 3,8% 3,6% 4,0% 4,0% 3,6% 4,2% 3,5% 3,9% 3,8% 3,4% 4,3% 100% 
  7,7%  7,7%  7,7%  7,7%  7,7%  7,7%  7,7%  7,7%  7,7%  7,7%  7,7%  7,7%  7,7%  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TAB. 4 – COLUMN PROFILES 
 v1 W1 v2 W2 v3 W3 v4 W4 v5 W5 v6 W6 v7 W7 v8 W8 v9 W9 t1 T1 t2 T2 t3 T3 t4 T4 total 
AUstralia 0,0% 10,0% 4,0% 6,9% 0,0% 9,3% 10,5% 0,0% 0,0% 7,9% 6,9% 4,3% 7,1% 2,9% 10,5% 0,0% 5,6% 5,0% 0,0% 11,1% 0,0% 11,5% 0,0% 10,7% 11,8% 0,0% 5,3% 
AuStria 8,3% 2,5% 6,7% 3,4% 3,0% 7,0% 5,3% 5,3% 5,3% 5,3% 6,9% 4,3% 9,5% 0,0% 10,5% 0,0% 11,1% 0,0% 10,0% 0,0% 6,5% 3,8% 6,9% 3,6% 5,9% 4,8% 5,3% 
BElgium 8,3% 2,5% 5,3% 5,2% 6,1% 4,7% 10,5% 0,0% 10,5% 2,6% 10,3% 2,1% 9,5% 0,0% 10,5% 0,0% 5,6% 5,0% 5,0% 5,6% 6,5% 3,8% 3,4% 7,1% 5,9% 4,8% 5,3% 
Canada 0,0% 10,0% 2,7% 8,6% 3,0% 7,0% 2,6% 7,9% 0,0% 7,9% 3,4% 6,4% 0,0% 11,8% 0,0% 10,5% 0,0% 10,0% 0,0% 11,1% 3,2% 7,7% 3,4% 7,1% 0,0% 9,5% 5,3% 
DEnmark 2,8% 7,5% 2,7% 8,6% 12,1% 0,0% 5,3% 5,3% 5,3% 5,3% 13,8% 0,0% 4,8% 5,9% 5,3% 5,3% 11,1% 0,0% 10,0% 0,0% 0,0% 11,5% 3,4% 7,1% 5,9% 4,8% 5,3% 
Finland 5,6% 5,0% 6,7% 3,4% 6,1% 4,7% 5,3% 5,3% 10,5% 2,6% 13,8% 0,0% 9,5% 0,0% 10,5% 0,0% 5,6% 5,0% 10,0% 0,0% 6,5% 3,8% 10,3% 0,0% 11,8% 0,0% 5,3% 
France 8,3% 2,5% 8,0% 1,7% 3,0% 7,0% 7,9% 2,6% 5,3% 5,3% 0,0% 8,5% 9,5% 0,0% 5,3% 5,3% 5,6% 5,0% 5,0% 5,6% 9,7% 0,0% 10,3% 0,0% 0,0% 9,5% 5,3% 
GErmany 8,3% 2,5% 8,0% 1,7% 6,1% 4,7% 10,5% 0,0% 15,8% 0,0% 3,4% 6,4% 9,5% 0,0% 5,3% 5,3% 5,6% 5,0% 10,0% 0,0% 6,5% 3,8% 6,9% 3,6% 0,0% 9,5% 5,3% 
Italy 11,1% 0,0% 9,3% 0,0% 0,0% 9,3% 0,0% 10,5% 5,3% 5,3% 3,4% 6,4% 7,1% 2,9% 5,3% 5,3% 5,6% 5,0% 5,0% 5,6% 9,7% 0,0% 10,3% 0,0% 5,9% 4,8% 5,3% 
Japan 2,8% 7,5% 1,3% 10,3% 6,1% 4,7% 0,0% 10,5% 0,0% 7,9% 0,0% 8,5% 0,0% 11,8% 0,0% 10,5% 5,6% 5,0% 5,0% 5,6% 3,2% 7,7% 0,0% 10,7% 5,9% 4,8% 5,3% 
NOrway 5,6% 5,0% 6,7% 3,4% 6,1% 4,7% 2,6% 7,9% 10,5% 2,6% 10,3% 2,1% 4,8% 5,9% 10,5% 0,0% 11,1% 0,0% 10,0% 0,0% 3,2% 7,7% 3,4% 7,1% 5,9% 4,8% 5,3% 
NZealand 0,0% 10,0% 4,0% 6,9% 0,0% 9,3% 10,5% 0,0% 0,0% 7,9% 6,9% 4,3% 2,4% 8,8% 0,0% 10,5% 0,0% 10,0% 0,0% 11,1% 3,2% 7,7% 0,0% 10,7% 11,8% 0,0% 5,3% 
Netherlands 5,6% 5,0% 6,7% 3,4% 9,1% 2,3% 5,3% 5,3% 0,0% 7,9% 0,0% 8,5% 4,8% 5,9% 0,0% 10,5% 5,6% 5,0% 5,0% 5,6% 6,5% 3,8% 6,9% 3,6% 5,9% 4,8% 5,3% 
POrtugal 11,1% 0,0% 5,3% 5,2% 6,1% 4,7% 0,0% 10,5% 10,5% 2,6% 3,4% 6,4% 4,8% 5,9% 5,3% 5,3% 5,6% 5,0% 5,0% 5,6% 3,2% 7,7% 10,3% 0,0% 5,9% 4,8% 5,3% 
Spain 11,1% 0,0% 9,3% 0,0% 9,1% 2,3% 7,9% 2,6% 0,0% 7,9% 0,0% 8,5% 4,8% 5,9% 5,3% 5,3% 5,6% 5,0% 0,0% 11,1% 9,7% 0,0% 6,9% 3,6% 5,9% 4,8% 5,3% 
SWeden 5,6% 5,0% 9,3% 0,0% 12,1% 0,0% 2,6% 7,9% 15,8% 0,0% 13,8% 0,0% 7,1% 2,9% 5,3% 5,3% 11,1% 0,0% 10,0% 0,0% 9,7% 0,0% 10,3% 0,0% 11,8% 0,0% 5,3% 
SwitZerland 2,8% 7,5% 4,0% 6,9% 9,1% 2,3% 2,6% 7,9% 5,3% 5,3% 0,0% 8,5% 2,4% 8,8% 5,3% 5,3% 0,0% 10,0% 10,0% 0,0% 3,2% 7,7% 0,0% 10,7% 0,0% 9,5% 5,3% 
UK 2,8% 7,5% 0,0% 12,1% 0,0% 9,3% 10,5% 0,0% 0,0% 7,9% 3,4% 6,4% 2,4% 8,8% 5,3% 5,3% 0,0% 10,0% 0,0% 11,1% 3,2% 7,7% 3,4% 7,1% 0,0% 9,5% 5,3% 
Usa 0,0% 10,0% 0,0% 12,1% 3,0% 7,0% 0,0% 10,5% 0,0% 7,9% 0,0% 8,5% 0,0% 11,8% 0,0% 10,5% 0,0% 10,0% 0,0% 11,1% 6,5% 3,8% 3,4% 7,1% 0,0% 9,5% 5,3% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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The description of the variables is in the following table: 
 
 
 
TAB. 5 – SCALE VARIABLES 
Variables Positive Negative 
EMPLPROT v1 W1 
LSTANDARS v2 W2 
REPLACRATIO v3 W3 
BENDUR v4 W4 
ACTIVELABO v5 W5 
UNIONDENSITY v6 W6 
BARGAINCOVERA v7 W7 
DEGCENTR v8 W8 
DEGCOORD1 (Union) v9 W9 
DEGCOORD2 (Employer) t1 T1 
PAYTAX t2 T2 
TOTTAX t3 T3 
GOVERNANCE t4 T4 
TOTUNEMP u1 U1 
SHORTUNEMP u2 U2 
LONGUNEMP u3 U3 
 
 
 
The last variables (short term, long term and total unemploy-
ment) are taken as supplementary variables. 
The results are reported in tab. 6a, 6b, 6c e 6d. The first 
shows the decomposition of inertia with respect to the principal 
axes and contains the eigenvalues of the matrix of the inertia (or 
chi - squared) contribution of the variables. Each axis accounts for 
a part of the inertia, and this is expressed as a percentage as well 
as is graphically displayed in the form of a histogram. The first di-
mension explains 42.13% of total inertia or the correlation between 
rows and columns. The second one accounts for 17,57% whereas 
the third dimension for 13,84% (Tab. 6a). The threshold value 
adopted in order to choose the significant dimensions is the ratio 
1/Q, where Q is the number of the variables, which is 13 as the 
other 13 variables are linearly dependent on their complements. 
The threshold value is 1/13 = 0.076 and following it we consider 
only the first three dimensions as the fourth one is below this 
value. 
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TAB 6a – PRINCIPAL INERTAS AND IERTIA PERCENTAGES 
1 0,210721 42,13% ************************************************** 
2 0,087892 17,57% ********************* 
3 0,069227 13,84% ***************** 
4 0,040432 8,08% ******* 
5 0,025002 5,00% ****** 
6 0,020913 4,18% **** 
7 0,012048 2,41% *** 
11 0,010388 2,08% ** 
13 0,00831 1,66% ** 
12 0,006501 1,30% * 
10 0,00383 0,77% * 
9 0,003395 0,68% * 
8 0,001514 0,30%  
14 0 0,00%  
15 0 0,00%  
16 0 0,00%  
17 0 0,00%  
18 0 0,00%  
19 0 0,00%  
20 0 0,00%  
21 0 0,00%  
22 0 0,00%  
23 0 0,00%  
24 0 0,00%  
25 0 0,00%  
 0,500173 = C2/N  494,1713/988 
Chi-square statistic = 494,1713 (d.f. = 450 = 18´25). 
 
 
 
In the following tables the results regarding the 19 countries 
(Tab. 6b), the active variables (Tab. 6c), and the supplementary 
variables (Tab. 6d) are reported. Each table contains the informa-
tion on: 
QLT: a quality measure (communalities in the Analysis of Principal 
Components) indicating in what percentage the chosen dimen-
sions explain the inertia of the variables or individuals. For in-
stance, in Tab. 6b the contribution to the inertia of the first country 
is contained in the first three dimensions by 89%. 
MASS: row masses (average column profile) in Tab. 6b and col-
umn masses (average row profile) in Tab. 6c. 
INR: the contribution of each variable or individual to total inertia. For 
instance, in Tab. 6b the first country contributes to total inertia by 7,3%. 
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COORD: co-ordinates of the variables or individuals with respect 
to the dimensions. 
CORR: the percentage of the contributions to the variables or indi-
viduals inertia, explained by each dimension. For instance, in Tab. 
6b the first dimension accounts for the contribution to the first 
country inertia (7,3% of total inertia) by 9,5%, whereas the second 
dimension by 49,6% and the third one by 29,6%. 
CTR: indicating to what extent each variable or individual contrib-
utes to the inertia explained by each dimension. In Tab. 6a, the 
first dimension explains 42% of total inertia, of which 1.7% is ex-
plained by the first country (Tab. 6b). Geometrically, CTR shows to 
what extent the axis orientation is determined by a single variable. 
TAB. 6b – ROW CONTRIBUTION 
  First dimension Second dimension Third dimension 
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AU 0,887 0,053 0,073 0,257 0,095 0,017 0,587 0,496 0,206 0,453 0,296 0,156 
AS 0,672 0,053 0,037 -0,477 0,646 0,057 0,045 0,006 0,001 0,086 0,021 0,006 
BE 0,728 0,053 0,036 -0,336 0,333 0,028 0,204 0,123 0,025 0,304 0,272 0,070 
CA 0,901 0,053 0,061 0,706 0,861 0,125 -0,083 0,012 0,004 -0,128 0,028 0,012 
DA 0,807 0,053 0,055 -0,171 0,056 0,007 0,492 0,463 0,145 -0,387 0,287 0,114 
FI 0,777 0,053 0,058 -0,614 0,680 0,094 0,226 0,092 0,031 0,055 0,005 0,002 
FR 0,848 0,053 0,041 -0,193 0,096 0,009 -0,461 0,543 0,127 0,287 0,210 0,062 
GE 0,432 0,053 0,052 -0,416 0,350 0,043 -0,172 0,060 0,018 0,105 0,022 0,008 
IT 0,660 0,053 0,046 -0,260 0,154 0,017 -0,461 0,485 0,127 0,096 0,021 0,007 
JA 0,851 0,053 0,053 0,521 0,542 0,068 0,020 0,001 0,000 -0,393 0,308 0,118 
NO 0,767 0,053 0,039 -0,381 0,396 0,036 0,285 0,222 0,049 -0,234 0,149 0,042 
NZ 0,750 0,053 0,074 0,581 0,480 0,084 0,327 0,152 0,064 0,288 0,118 0,063 
OL 0,395 0,053 0,023 0,120 0,067 0,004 -0,254 0,299 0,039 -0,080 0,030 0,005 
PO 0,435 0,053 0,031 -0,195 0,128 0,010 -0,247 0,205 0,037 -0,175 0,102 0,023 
SP 0,520 0,053 0,046 -0,015 0,001 0,000 -0,393 0,350 0,093 0,273 0,170 0,057 
SV 0,778 0,053 0,090 -0,766 0,684 0,147 0,053 0,003 0,002 -0,279 0,091 0,059 
SZ 0,466 0,053 0,046 0,277 0,174 0,019 -0,008 0,000 0,000 -0,359 0,292 0,098 
UK 0,802 0,053 0,059 0,601 0,641 0,090 0,067 0,008 0,003 0,294 0,153 0,066 
US 0,904 0,053 0,078 0,762 0,779 0,145 -0,226 0,069 0,031 -0,204 0,056 0,032 
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As to the choice of the variables to take into consideration, in 
conventional analysis some criteria are based on the evaluation of 
the following bits of information: 
- CORR, in each dimension one considers those variables with 
a CORR higher than the percentage of total inertia explained 
by each dimension; 
- -CTR, in each dimension one considers those variables with a 
TAB. 6c – COLUMN CONTRIBUTION 
  First dimension Second dimension Third dimension 
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v1 0,819 0,036 0,038 -0,497 0,470 0,043 -0,409 0,319 0,069 0,126 0,030 0,008 
W1 0,819 0,040 0,034 0,447 0,470 0,038 0,368 0,319 0,062 -0,114 0,030 0,008 
v2 0,790 0,043 0,027 -0,433 0,610 0,039 -0,203 0,134 0,020 0,119 0,046 0,009 
W2 0,790 0,034 0,034 0,560 0,610 0,050 0,262 0,134 0,026 -0,154 0,046 0,011 
v3 0,552 0,033 0,035 -0,307 0,182 0,015 0,012 0,000 0,000 -0,438 0,370 0,092 
W3 0,552 0,044 0,027 0,235 0,182 0,011 -0,009 0,000 0,000 0,336 0,370 0,071 
v4 0,718 0,038 0,042 -0,019 0,001 0,000 0,244 0,108 0,026 0,580 0,609 0,187 
W4 0,718 0,038 0,042 0,019 0,001 0,000 -0,244 0,108 0,026 -0,580 0,609 0,187 
v5 0,721 0,026 0,054 -0,851 0,689 0,088 0,033 0,001 0,000 -0,181 0,031 0,012 
W5 0,721 0,051 0,027 0,426 0,689 0,044 -0,016 0,001 0,000 0,090 0,031 0,006 
v6 0,817 0,029 0,051 -0,541 0,334 0,041 0,648 0,480 0,140 -0,052 0,003 0,001 
W6 0,817 0,048 0,032 0,334 0,334 0,025 -0,400 0,480 0,087 0,032 0,003 0,001 
v7 0,916 0,043 0,034 -0,533 0,711 0,057 0,005 0,000 0,000 0,287 0,205 0,050 
W7 0,916 0,034 0,042 0,659 0,711 0,071 -0,006 0,000 0,000 -0,354 0,205 0,062 
v8 0,702 0,038 0,040 -0,486 0,449 0,043 0,278 0,147 0,034 0,236 0,106 0,031 
W8 0,702 0,038 0,040 0,486 0,449 0,043 -0,278 0,147 0,034 -0,236 0,106 0,031 
v9 0,708 0,036 0,038 -0,572 0,623 0,057 0,150 0,043 0,009 -0,149 0,042 0,012 
W9 0,708 0,040 0,034 0,515 0,623 0,051 -0,135 0,043 0,008 0,134 0,042 0,011 
t1 0,823 0,040 0,050 -0,593 0,571 0,067 0,108 0,019 0,005 -0,378 0,233 0,084 
T1 0,823 0,036 0,055 0,659 0,571 0,075 -0,120 0,019 0,006 0,420 0,233 0,093 
t2 0,751 0,042 0,027 -0,247 0,188 0,012 -0,411 0,521 0,081 0,117 0,042 0,008 
T2 0,751 0,035 0,032 0,295 0,188 0,014 0,490 0,521 0,096 -0,139 0,042 0,010 
t3 0,785 0,039 0,040 -0,487 0,462 0,044 -0,405 0,319 0,073 0,047 0,004 0,001 
T3 0,785 0,038 0,042 0,504 0,462 0,046 0,419 0,319 0,076 -0,049 0,004 0,001 
t4 0,417 0,034 0,044 -0,292 0,132 0,014 0,412 0,264 0,066 0,117 0,021 0,007 
T4 0,417 0,043 0,036 0,236 0,132 0,011 -0,333 0,264 0,054 -0,094 0,021 0,005 
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CTR higher than i 1/13 = 0.076. 
As we used the doubling technique, graphical analysis is more 
helpful as allows visualising how the variables are positioned with 
respect to dimensions. In any case, the position and the signifi-
cance of the variables and countries positively depend on the re-
spective values of CORR and CTR. In this respect the variables 
considered as relevant in the determination of the first dimension 
have the value of CORR greater than 42.13%, greater than 
17.57% for the second one and than 13.84 for the last dimension. 
 
 
 
TAB. 6d – CONTRIBUTION OF SUPPLEMENTARY VARIABLE 
  First dimension Second dimension Third dimension 
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u1 0,233 0,036 0,045 0,011 0 0 0,021 0,001 0 0,362 0,217 0,066 
U1 0,233 0,055 0,029 -0,007 0 0 -0,014 0,001 0 -0,236 0,217 0,043 
u2 0,154 0,032 0,039 0,140 0,033 0,003 0,169 0,049 0,011 0,172 0,050 0,013 
U2 0,154 0,036 0,035 -0,126 0,033 0,003 -0,152 0,049 0,010 -0,154 0,050 0,012 
u3 0,417 0,028 0,055 -0,239 0,059 0,007 -0,286 0,084 0,026 0,514 0,271 0,102 
U3 0,417 0,063 0,024 0,104 0,059 0,003 0,124 0,084 0,011 -0,223 0,271 0,044 
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GRAPH. 1 – FIRST AND SECOND DIMENSION, PRINCIPAL CO-ORDINATES, 
ROW VARIABLES 
 
 
Horizontal axis is dimension 1 with inertia = 0.2107 (42.13%) 
Vertical axis is dimension 2 with inertia = 0.08789 (17.6%) 
59.7% of total inertia is represented in the above map 
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GRAPH. 2 – FIRST AND SECOND DIMENSION, PRINCIPAL CO-ORDINATES, 
COLUMN VARIABLES 
 
 
Horizontal axis is dimension 1 with inertia = 0.2107 (42.13%) 
Vertical axis is dimension 2 with inertia = 0.08789 (17.6%) 
59.7% of total inertia is represented in the above map 
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GRAPH. 3 – FIRST AND SECOND DIMENSION, PRINCIPAL CO-ORDINATES, 
SUPPLEMENTARY VARIABLES 
 
 
Horizontal axis is dimension 1 with inertia = 0.2107 (42.13%) 
Vertical axis is dimension 2 with inertia = 0.08789 (17.6%) 
59.7% of total inertia is represented in the above map 
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GRAPH. 4 – SECOND AND THIRD DIMENSION, PRINCIPAL CO-ORDINATES, 
ROW VARIABLES 
 
 
Horizontal axis is dimension 2 with inertia = 0.0878 (17.6%) 
Vertical axis is dimension 2 with inertia = 0.0692 (13.8%) 
31.4% of total inertia is represented in the above map 
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GRAPH. 5 – SECOND AND THIRD DIMENSION, PRINCIPAL CO-ORDINATES, 
COLUMN VARIABLES 
 
 
Horizontal axis is dimension 2 with inertia = 0.0878 (17.6%) 
Vertical axis is dimension 2 with inertia = 0.0692 (13.8%) 
31.4% of total inertia is represented in the above map 
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GRAPH. 6 – SECOND AND THIRD DIMENSION, PRINCIPAL CO-ORDINATES, 
SUPPLEMENTARY VARIABLES 
 
 
Horizontal axis is dimension 2 with inertia = 0.0878 (17.6%) 
Vertical axis is dimension 2 with inertia = 0.0692 (13.8%) 
31.4% of total inertia is represented in the above map 
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5. Dimensions analysis 
 
 
First dimension 
 
Looking at the map describing the first and the second dimen-
sion, we can easily see two different groups of countries. In each 
one we find the countries with the same institutional setting, as al-
ready stated in the literature. Therefore, following the standard dis-
tinction between regulated and non-regulated countries, we can 
easily interpret the first two dimensions. Moreover, knowing each 
dimension components (variables which contribute more to each 
dimension), we can add some specific marks to the institutional 
setting. Table 7 lists the variables contributing more to each di-
mension, with the corresponding correlation sign. 
 
 
 
TAB. 7 – VARIABLES CARACHTERISING THE FIRST THREE DIMENSIONS 
First dimension Second dimension Third dimension 
COORD1 (-) UNIONDEN (+) BENDUR (+) 
COORD2 (-) GOVERN (+) REPLRATIO (-) 
ACTIVELAB (-) TTAX (-)   
EMPLPROT (-) PTAX (-)   
BARGCOV (-)     
CENTR (-)     
LSTAND (-)     
 
 
 
We identify in the first dimension four subgroups of variables. 
The first one includes all the variables concerning co-ordination 
within organizations: unions and employers coordination. It simply 
represents bargaining co-ordination. 
Centralisation and bargaining coverage are indicators describ-
ing the main features of bargaining structure. They form the sec-
ond subgroup defined as bargaining structure. Taking together the 
first and the second subgroup we get an indicator of bargaining 
structure and coordination. 
In the third subgroup we lists indicators of work legislation: ri-
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gidity of rules concerning hiring and firing (employment protection) 
and working conditions (labour standards). They summarise the 
extent of employed protection, here labelled as insiders regulation. 
Expenditures in active labour market policies represent a single 
group, showing the extent of government intervention in labour 
market. Basically, the third and the fourth subgroups describe a 
particular type of government intervention on labour market about 
specific issues and targets. 
A more in-depth analysis of the variable subgroups high-
lights that active labour market policy plays an indirect address-
ing role, guiding toward preferred performance results, chosen 
by the government. From this perspective, active policy associ-
ated with within-organisation-co-ordination is an indicator of 
overall market co-ordination. What we want to emphasise is the 
combination of government intervention with intra partes co-
ordination, the latter concerning mainly (non-government) labour 
market agents/organisations, nominally unions and employer 
confederations. According to the theoretical framework under-
pinning our analysis, this variable set summarises co-ordination 
on labour market, implemented both by the government and the 
bargaining sides. Union and employer confederations co-
ordinate the market when harmonising their actions. Govern-
ment co-ordinate market functioning guiding it towards specific 
targets with labour active policy implementation: workers train-
ing programmes, for example, have to meet the needs of new 
types of labour demand. Our basic hypothesis is that organisa-
tional forms embodying intra partes co-ordination help the diffu-
sion of and the access to. This enables each unit to overcome 
transaction costs in gathering information about incentives and 
chances on the market. This opportunity has a stronger promi-
nence when price signalling cannot co-ordinate agents’ actions 
by its own. If the availability of broader information sets to 
agents enhances market functioning, one way to build up this 
set and to spread information is to combine organisations co-
ordination and active labour market policies. 
Centralisation and bargaining coverage may be interpreted as 
an enforcement device of bargaining co-ordination. These factors 
involve the members of each social partner in wage determination 
rules resulting from intra partes co-ordination. 
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Figure 1 shows the structure of the interpretation of the first 
dimension. 
 
 
 
FIG. 1 – FIRST DIMENSION 
 
 
 
 
Following the aggregation criterion displayed in figure 1, the 
first dimension represents market deregulation. In graphic 2, all 
positive poles lie on the left side, while the negative ones are on 
the right side. This means that the first dimension is a “size dimen-
sion” following the doubling technique: some countries have higher 
ratings than others. In this analysis deregulated countries (Can-
ada, US, Japan, UK) have lower ratings for all the variables. This 
strong feature of the countries enables us to shift to the second 
and third dimension plane. 
Graphic 1 shows each country position with respect to the first 
dimension. It is easy to see a broad distinction between two 
groups of countries. On the one hand we find all the countries 
where labour market has a non-regulated structure (US, UK, Can-
ada, New Zealand and Japanvii). Other countries plotted in asso-
ciation with positive values of the first dimension are closer to the 
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first dimension: they are not strongly characterised by variables 
contributing to the zero of the first dimension. On the other hand, 
among the countries associated to the negative values of the first 
dimension, Finland Austria and Sweden contribute more to the first 
dimension. 
 
 
Second dimension 
 
Variable contributing to the second factor correspond to an-
other type of government intervention. The first variable contribut-
ing to the second dimension is government involvement, describ-
ing how government intervenes in wage bargaining and encom-
passing the provision of economic forecasts to bargaining part-
ners, minimum wage guidelines or norms, or signing formal tripar-
tite agreements on national wage schedule with or without sanc-
tions (Flanagan, 1999). The government can also impose wage 
freeze and prohibit local wage bargaining. With a higher govern-
ment involvement, government plays a major role in imposing and 
enforcing wage policies. 
Another variable contributing to the second dimension is union 
density, which, in this framework, may be interpreted as a factor 
supporting the co-ordinating role of the government in wage bar-
gaining. Government involvement along with union density may in-
dicate to what extent the decisions concerning wage setting are 
binding for the whole economy. This combination has been defined 
as “bargaining governance”, meant as the set of rules and 
organisational forms governing the bargaining process. This 
subgroup, therefore, includes some coordination enforcement 
devices of the bargaining results, deriving from intra partes 
coordination and government involvement. They are enforcement 
devices because they help to impose wage rules on all the social 
partners members. Following the well-known Calmfors and Driffill 
(1988) model, which Soskice (1990) extended by considering the 
intra partes co-ordination aspects, this set of variables emphasises 
the inter partes co-ordination role of the government aimed at 
making labour market policies targets binding all over the 
economy. Payrolltax and totaltax are variables representing fiscal policy 
tools, which can be used to influence labour market performance. 
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These two variables are closely linked to government involvement 
and are negatively correlated to the second dimension. They can 
be used in association with the government involvement in order to 
implement income policies as an alternative to mere fiscal policy. 
Income policies and bargaining governance suggests the exis-
tence of a macro control of wages, which specifies a type of gov-
ernment intervention complementary with the one described in the 
first dimension, concerning more specific targets and policy meas-
ures. Figure 2 shows how the variables have been aggregated in 
order to define second dimension. 
 
 
 
FIG. 2 – SECOND DIMENSION 
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Europe countries and The Netherlands are plotted near to zero of 
the second dimension; Central Europe and Northern countries are 
characterised by the intermediate ratings for the second dimen-
sion, while Denmark alone has a higher position in the graphicviii. 
Among the countries on the left part, Australia contributes more to 
the second dimension. 
 
 
Third dimension 
 
The indicators based on passive labour market policies (re-
placement ratio, benefit duration) contribute to the third dimension. 
The groups of countries, homogeneous with respect to the first and 
second dimension, show some differences when considering the 
third dimension. In particular, higher values of benefit duration and 
lower values of replacement ratio contribute to the third dimension 
positive axis. This is compatible with the evidence that more gener-
ous unemployment benefits have a shorter duration. 
With respect to the third dimension the country groups previ-
ously defined show internal differences. In more details, Portugal 
does not have the same position as the other South Europe coun-
tries any more, because it is closer to the non-regulated countries 
group (Canada, USA, Switzerland and Japan). Norway, Sweden, 
Finland and Austria show the same aggregation as before, with 
minor differences in passive policies. Australia and New Zealand 
are still in a spurious group, where Belgium and UK enter too. 
 
 
Unemployment and dimensions 
 
In this paper we use long run, short run and total unemploy-
ment as control variables. Long run unemployment is negatively 
associated with the first and the second dimension, while short run 
unemployment has a positive association with both. Institutional 
settings based on labour market deregulation are associated with 
higher short run unemployment, while co-ordinated countries with-
out any wage control are associated with higher long run unem-
ployment. Moreover, long run unemployment is positively associ-
ated with the third dimension too. 
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Countries' ranking is summarised in Table 8 in further details. 
Each box lists the countries with approximately the same level of 
market deregulation and wage control. Within each box, countries 
with higher unemployed protection are in the bottom line. The 
shadowed box represents the dimension combination associated 
with long run unemployment. Countries in bold characters have the 
highest values for long run unemployment. 
 
 
 
TABLE 8 – COUNTRIES RANKING BASED ON LONG RUN UNEMPLOYMENT 
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It is now possible to draw some broad remarks. First, the mar-
ket regulation and low wage control combination is associated with 
higher long run unemployment. We cannot claim the opposite rela-
tion because countries with lower long run unemployment (Japan, 
Sweden and Switzerland) are spread all over the diagram. Refer-
ring to the third dimension, the relation with long run unemploy-
ment is positive: countries with higher long run unemployment al-
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ways are in the bottom line of each box. The latter relation mainly 
holds for the countries in the shadowed box. In this context we 
cannot state the direction of the causality relation: it may be that 
unemployment benefits have a longer duration (and a lower re-
placement ratio) where the institutional setting causes long run un-
employment to a greater extent and vice versa. 
In the following table (Tab. 9) we find a similar ranking accord-
ing to which countries in bold characters present a higher short run 
unemployment. This control variable exhibits a positive correlation 
with all the three dimensions. Nevertheless, her ranking does not 
explain much more as to the difference of performances among 
countries. 
 
 
 
TABLE 9 – COUNTRIES RANKING BASED ON SHORT RUN UNEMPLOY-
MENT 
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The ranking of the countries on total unemployment yields a 
more interesting table (table 10): total unemployment shows a 
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clear-cut correlation with countries associated with high values of 
the third dimension (passive policies), market deregulation ad 
wage control. 
 
 
 
TAB. 10 – COUNTRIES RANKING BASED ON TOTAL UNEMPLOYMENT 
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6. Some concluding remarks 
 
 
Two groups of countries emerge from the above analysis. The 
former does not have any institutional co-ordination devices be-
yond the market itself. The latter has a common ground of organ-
isational forms furthering informational flows. These organisational 
forms smooth labour market functioning fostering the achievement 
of consensual targets. But the co-ordinated institutional model 
shows the worst long-run performances in some regulated coun-
tries. This is particularly true in countries where there is not any 
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wage control supporting market regulation. As our dimensions 
show, among all the possible institutional combinations there are 
only few that perform well in terms of unemployment performance. 
This evidence supports the need for relations taking into account 
the complementarity among complex institutional forms. The 
equivalence of different institutional combinations depends on the 
targets that have been specified (long run instead of short run un-
employment, unemployment versus equity). 
From the analysis emerges a correlation between passive 
policies and unemployment (total and long run), stronger where 
specific institutional combinations arise. In more details, regulated 
markets without any strong wage control show the highest values 
for long run unemployment. Deregulated markets, with some wage 
control, have the worst total unemployment performance. It seems 
that government intervention is important both for wage control 
and unemployment rate. Government plays its market role using 
fiscal policy and/or directly intervening in the bargaining process, 
which helps to mediate among conflicting partners' objective func-
tions and to make individual interests compatible with macroeco-
nomic targets. The government's role of inter partes co-ordination 
is based on the choice of a combination of specific policy tools: 
strong bargaining intervention and lighter market intervention with 
traditional fiscal policy measures. This combination needs the di-
rect support of market regulation, inter partes co-ordination being 
an important factor. 
Mixed models (low/high high/low) have the worst perform-
ances, and in this case passive policies show a relation with un-
employment of ambiguous direction. Broadly speaking, active la-
bour market policies, by helping unemployed back into labour mar-
ket, may reduce perverse effects of too generous subsidies. But 
policies perform well if unemployment benefits have a shorter du-
ration (Nickell, 1997; OECD, 1993). Higher benefits combined with 
low pressure on unemployed to search a job, or worker (re-) train-
ing programs, give up to rigidities that “create unemployment or 
make it persistent” (Nickell, 1997). Other studies show positive ef-
fects of unemployment subsidies both with high and with low 
shares of active spending programs (Elmeshov, Martin, Scarpetta, 
1998). 
The unclear relation between passive policies and unemploy-
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ment suggests better specifying the current analysis. Further de-
velopments may improve it with more control variables in order to 
encompass all the possible government targets: the correlation 
with variables regarding labour market equity must be tested. On 
the other hand, it could be of some interest to take the regulated 
countries alone to separately analyse the latent factor. 
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i The “reflected” of the original ratings is obtained by subtracting it from the high-
est value of the scale. 
ii The most basic concept in correspondence analysis is that of profile. The profile 
of a set of frequencies is simply the frequencies divided by their total. There are 
row profiles and column profiles, the former are obtained dividing each row fre-
quencies by their row sum, the latter are obtained dividing each column frequen-
cies by their column sum. Then we have the average column profile, which is the 
profile of the last column and the average row profile which is the profile of the 
last row. Finally, the average column profile is also the row masses and the aver-
age row profile is also the column masses. The word ‘mass’ is a term preferred in 
correspondence analysis although it is entirely equivalent to the term ‘weight’. 
iii In order to have equal weights, it is necessary to have the same scale for each 
variable: in our case we have a rating scale ranging from 0 to 4. 
iv The inertia or total inertia is the weighted average of the squared c2 distances 
between the row profiles and their average profile and indicates the dispersion of 
row profiles. When the inertia is low, the row profiles are not dispersed very 
much, and lie close to their average profile. They do not extend out to the column 
vertex point and lower is the association, or correlation, between rows and col-
umns (the same holds for the column profiles and their average). 
v The centroid (or centre of gravity or mean vector) is the average row profile 
(columns masses) in the row space and the average column profile (row masses) 
in the column space. 
vi As one can see from Tab 1, some variables have been originally provided as 
scale indices by OCSE, others, on the contrary, are continuous variables. For the 
sake of homogeneity, the latter have been transformed in ratings as well. The 
method used for the transformation is based on the division of continuous values 
in classes and the attribution of an increasing scale index to the classes with ris-
ing values. The division has led to a maximum of 5 classes by grouping the val-
ues representing 20, 40, 60, 80 and 100% of cumulate intensities. Equal intensi-
ties and class coherence have been taken into account through a cautious analy-
sis of the data. 
vii For Japan it would be useful a more in-depth analysis as this country is charac-
terised by a high degree of bargaining coordination. 
viii Countries contributing more to the second dimension are Italy, France and 
Spain, with negative correlation, and Denmark and Australia with positive correla-
tion. 
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